nature'), the collaboration between (semiotic) biology, social sciences and humanities is genuine for these are sciences that study meaning-making. 2 Th e meeting in London was intended to discuss the contemporary change in the theory of evolution -the replacement of the standard theory (also called Modern Synthesis, neo-Darwinism, etc.) by a more relevant (and also more fundamental) one, that is variably called the Extended Synthesis or post-Darwinism, yet can also be called a semiotic theory of evolution.
To put it briefl y, this contemporary approach can show, "why genes are usually followers, not leaders, in evolutionary change" (West-Eberhard 2003: 29) . Th e core of this turn can be described as follows.
Th e basis of the standard theory was formulated by Charles Darwin, later it became somewhat more limited as connected to genetics by neo-Darwinians, and updated and mathematized as the Modern Synthesis during several decades since the 1930s. It claims that evolutionary innovation is caused by random changes in the genome, followed by diff erential reproductive "success". Th is means that an evolutionary change begins from stochastic changes in genetic memory that create diversity, and is aft erwards tested by diff erential reproduction of genetically diff erent variants (which is, by defi nition, natural selection). In this case, the "meaningfulness" of any forms and changes exclusively relies upon the fact of survival, or fi tness. Moreover, speaking about the meaning of the changes will always stay metaphorical or illusionary for a neo-Darwinian approach.
According to the alternative mechanism, the evolutionary change would begin with the organisms' new responses or new solutions to the problems they face (a new choice between options), using their resource of plasticity; this meaningful plastic change may become stabilized by soft (epigenetic or ecological) inheritance. If the stabilization lasts long enough, random changes in the genome (especially due to recombination, but not only) may lead to hard inheritance of the change. Since a plastic change of an organism's processes can be meaningful in the fi rst place (because it is carried out by a perception-action cycle -called a 'functional circle' by Jakob von Uexküll) , this mechanism can be called a semiotic one.
Both these mechanisms describe adaptive changes, yet in addition many nonadaptive changes exist in evolution -the well-studied genetic drift , as well as meaningless plastic changes (those that arise without the involvement of a choice between options) that may become hereditary.
Th e way towards the contemporary change in the theory of evolution has been paved by earlier developments in the study of life, knowledge of which can help to understand the turn. 
Theoretical biology
Th eoretical biology with its more-than-a-century-long history has been developing a view that largely includes most of the statements that are now overthrowing the strictly Darwinian view. Notably, the whole fi eld of theoretical biology as known under this name started with monographs by Johannes Reinke and Jakob von Uexküll that were very critical of the Darwinian account of life processes. Later, the Th eoretical Biology Club in London in the 1930s (see, e.g., Niemann 2014; Peterson 2017 ) and Waddington's Symposia "Towards a Th eoretical Biology" in 1966 Biology" in -1970 developed an approach that was largely structuralist. 3 Much the same tradition, together with a view critical of neo-Darwinism, has been followed by the annual Estonian Spring Schools in Th eoretical Biology conducted since the 1970s, as well as the series of symposia organized by the Konrad Lorenz Institute in Altenberg, Austria, and their book series. 4 An Altenberg symposium held in 2008 was even thought to have become something like the Woodstock of Evolution (Whitfi eld 2008).
For a better understanding of the structure of biological thought, it could be instructive to characterize some of it via the opposition between structuralism and functionalism. For instance, Elliot Murphy writes:
Whereas many have characterised the central debate in nineteenth-century biology as being between evolutionists and creationists, a more accurate classifi cation (as Darwin himself noted) would distinguish teleologists 5 (who regarded adaptation [as] the single most important aspect in evolution) with morphologists (who held that commonalities of structure were the defi ning biological characteristic) -a dichotomy stressed by E. S. Russell's Form and Function. Th e formalists (or, following Chomsky's terminology, 'internalists') include such fi gures as D' Arcy Th ompson, Brian Goodwin, Richard Owen, Stuart Kauff man, Geoff roy St. Hilaire, Richard Goldschmidt, Nikolai Severtzov, Louis Agassiz, Karl Ernst von Baer and Goethe (whose plant studies lead him to coin the term 'rational morphology'). Th ey focused on form and structural commonalities as their explana[n]dum, leaving aside the question of adaptive eff ects as a secondary concern. (Murphy 2012: 49-50) 3 See also an overview of two of these symposia by Waddington (1968). 4 My own fi rst encounter with the non-Darwinian views occurred at a Th eoretical Biology Winter School in Borok, Russia in 1976, where Sergei Meyen and his colleagues expressed their support to the nomogenetic theory of Lev Berg and Aleksandr Lyubischev. What decisively changed my understanding of evolution was a result in mathematical modelling of the eff ects of biparental reproduction on variability that proved the communicative origin of species (I published it in Estonian in Schola Biotheoretica in 1985).
5
It can be noticed that the terminology seems to be confusing -usually, it is Baer who has been considered to be a teleologist, and not Darwin. It depends on how we position adaptation (and learning).
Th is is the same opposition between functionalism and structuralism to which Stephen Jay Gould devoted his opus magnum, Th e Structure of Evolutionary Th eory, using it as his main thread of argument (Gould 2002) .
Accordingly, described as neither neo-Darwinian (selectionist) evolutionism (functionalism, in Gouldian terms) nor creationism, there is a third way of formalism, or structuralism, or internalism (as these concepts were treated in the quotation above from Murphy). Indeed, the scholars listed by Murphy (in a rather haphazard manner) are those more oft en referred to in writings representing the third way than in the Modern Synthesis ones.
Moreover, formalism, structuralism, and internalism are the approaches on which the 20th-century semiotics was based to a large degree. Th us the third way hints directly towards biosemiotics even if not using the term. And more than that: poststructuralist and cognitive approaches in semiotics go hand in hand with analogous trends in the evolutionary (epigenetic) thought of the late 20th century.
Yet there is more than that: since semiotics is not just about structure, but is fundamentally about meaning or function, the third way is another approach to functionality, and to the phenomenon of adaptation. Th e functionalism/structuralism opposition is not suffi cient to describe the situation, while the new approach provides a non-Darwinian model of adaptation.
Instead of a lengthy description of the predecessors of the current change, for instance a survey of the role of Karl Ernst von Baer, James Mark Baldwin, Lynn Margulis, and others, let me point out two more recent events paving the way for the Royal Society meeting in 2016.
meeting at the Linnean Society
One of these was a meeting organized by the British entomologist Richard VaneWright fi ve years earlier, almost at the same location and with the same aims. It took place on 8 September 2011 at the Linnean Society of London -remarkably in the same location on Piccadilly where the articles by Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace caused a turn in evolutionary biology in 1858.
Th e 2011 conference was titled "Th e role of behaviour in evolution -'organisms can be proud to have been their own designers'" 6 . Th e speakers were Peter Corning, Denis Walsh, John Dupré, Patrick Bateson, Anne Magurran, Gregory Grether, Birgit ArnholdtSchmitt, and Kalevi Kull; the audience included Peter Saunders, the late Mae-Wan Ho, and Robin Bruce. By no means a large event, it certainly was an infl uential step towards the conference held in nearby Carlton House Terrace fi ve years later. Delafi eld-Butt, and Robin W. Bruce. As it includes works that describe the role of agency and further details of a non-Darwinian mechanism of adaptation (incl. Bateson 2014; Kull 2014; etc.) , it has a direct bearing on the turn in evolutionary biology.
The third way of evolution
Evolutionary biology is a fi eld heavily intertwined with ideology (see, e.g., Kolchinskij 2014) . For instance, Darwinism of the early 20th century was oft en related to the eugenics movement; the vulgar Darwinism of Trofi m Lysenko was supported by Soviet Communist ideology in the 1940s-50s, as was the Synthetic Th eory of Evolution in the following decades; neo-Darwinism is supportive of and supported by neoliberal ideology; etc. Th is makes eff ecting the turn considerably more diffi cult. Obviously, it cannot be brought along by a single scientist, or by a single event. However, a whole series of discussions may make it happen.
Th e logical precision and completeness of the description of mechanisms discovered is certainly important. However, the terminology is oft en so imprecise -particularly as to the most general concepts especially in focus as concerns the changethat it is hard to formulate the necessary distinctions in an unambiguous way. For instance, even the term 'natural selection' -despite its mathematically clear defi nition in many works on population genetics -is defi ned very loosely (and variably) by most biologists.
In 2014, a group of scholars supporting the idea of the third way of evolution was formed. Th is project was launched by James Shapiro, Raju Pookottil (creator of the website) and Denis Noble, the last-named being the present leader of the group, whose reformulation of metaphors for general biology (Noble 2006; 2013) has been remarkably infl uential. Th e group is presented by an internet portal 7 that briefl y introduces the work of scholars (currently 60 in number) that has been instructive for rearranging the theory of evolution, or replacing the neo-Darwinian theory. Th us, the change is becoming truly collective: no earlier single attempt has been able to establish it, so the collective eff ort appears to be the only way to go in this situation.
Th e sharpness of the contrast can be seen, for instance, in a pair of articles presenting the opposing views quite recently published in Nature (Laland et al. 2014; Wray et al. 2014) . A set of interviews with some members of the third way of evolution (Mazur 2015) provides an insight into some aspects of the paradigm shift . 
The meeting itself: Royal Society, London, November 2016
Th e three-day conference "New trends in evolutionary biology: Biological, philosophical and social science perspectives" took place at the Royal Society of London, with close to 300 attendees. Th is 'Scientifi c Discussion Meeting' was organized by Denis Noble, Nancy Cartwright, Patrick Bateson, John Dupré and Kevin Laland in collaboration with the British Academy.
Th ere was a balanced overlap with speakers of the former meetings that paved the way for this one: there were Gerd Müller and Eva Jablonka from Altenberg 2008, while Patrick Bateson and John Dupré had been presenters at the 2011 Linnean Society meeting. From the members of the Th ird Way of Evolution interviewed in the book by Mazur (2015) the programme included Denis Noble and James Shapiro.
Th e preparation period for the meeting had lasted over two years, and as the organizers confessed, the programme had to be modifi ed even aft er acceptance by the host organizations, largely because of the reluctance by some neo-Darwinist biologists to take part. 8 However, the fi nal programme included supporters of rather opposing views, which benefi tted the resulting discussions, I fi nd. Th e following provides a few brief notes made on spot about the talks, in the order they were given. Day 1. In his welcome speech, Denis Noble reemphasized the importance of the fact of the British Academy and the Royal Society being the event's joint organizerswhich is in itself rare -and called for discussions between the humanities and natural sciences on evolutionary biology which is a very vigorous fi eld of science. He also mentioned that the organizers had been trying to balance the programme of the meeting since the outset.
Th e programme was opened by Gerd Mü ller's programmatic lecture "Th e extended evolutionary synthesis". Müller started with pointing out how the defi nition of evolution has changed: for Darwin it was 'descent with modifi cation' , for population geneticists 'change of gene frequencies in populations'; evolution has also been defi ned as 'species diversifi cation' , or as 'generation of organismal complexity' (evo-devo, systems biology, behavioural biology), or as the origin of mind, language, society, culture (anthropology, linguistics, social sciences).
According to Müller's claim, the Modern Synthesis (seeing natural selection as the only directional factor in evolution) can explain genetic variation in evolving populations very well. What the Modern Synthesis does not explain, however, is phenotypic complexity, the origin of body plans, phenotypic novelty, non-gradual forms of transition, non-genetic factors of change. He also pointed out that the microevolution-macroevolution distinction obscures the issues that emerge from the current challenges to the standard theory.
By describing a number of challenges for evolutionary biology of the past two decades, Müller provided an integrative view, for which he used the niche construction scheme of Odling-Smee, but adding more recursivity to it.
Müller claimed that a more complex and more pluralistic picture that we have reached now -the Extended Synthesis -is based on new evidence from multiple fi elds; it integrates them and has a heuristic value; it has its own predictions that are diff erent from the Modern Synthesis framework (see also Pigliucci, Müller 2010; Laland et al. 2015) . Douglas Futuyma in his lecture "Th e evolutionary synthesis today: Extend or amend?" responded to the position outlined by Müller, stating that most of the phenomena Müller described have been known already for a long time and have been integrated by the contemporary Modern Synthesis. He further demonstrated how several of these phenomena (including niche construction, plasticity, the Baldwin eff ect, restricted phenotypic variability, constraints on developmental directions, etc.) can be explained by the standard theory, according to which an improbable new thing begins with a single thing (change in a genome), and turns into a feature of a population via natural selection. Sonia Sultan in her paper "Developmental plasticity: Re-conceiving the genotype" described experiments with Polygonum plants that showed trans-generational plasticity, pointing out how the genetic information accessible for natural selection is dependent on the environment. According to her, a theory of adaptation that would describe adaptation on the individual level is still missing.
Russell Lande ("Evolution of phenotypic plasticity") spoke about correlated variation in the wild, showing how evolution of plasticity accelerates phenotypic evolution and adaptation. As he describes an evolutionary change, it begins with a rapid transient increase of plasticity, followed by slow genetic assimilation -all explainable on the basis of the assumptions of standard theory. At this conference, Lande, together with Futuyma, were the strongest supporters of the view that the basic assumptions of Modern Synthesis are capable of covering the explanations of phenomena related to learning and plasticity.
Tobias Uller ("Heredity and evolutionary theory") described a strong selfreferentiality in the evolution of organisms. Th e standard theory does not demonstrate clearly enough that variability, selection, and heredity are all changing themselves.
John Dupré ("Th e ontology of evolutionary process") spoke about the importance of process ontology in biology, noting that life consists of processes rather than things. He recalled that the Th eoretical Biology Club of the 1930s (including Joseph H. Woodger) was strongly infl uenced by Alfred Whitehead's process philosophy. Even genomes are not static, not to mention other systems of life. An organism should be viewed as a hierarchy of developmental processes which are stabilized, not by inertia, but by activity.
Paul Brakefi eld ("Does the way in which development works bias the paths taken by evolution?") analysed the phenomenon of developmental bias using the data on eyespot pattern evolution on butterfl y wings. He showed, for instance, that there exists fl exibility in size but not that much in colour of eyespots. Th us the way development works and the restrictions it poses can contribute to shaping evolution.
Kevin Laland had titled his presentation as "Th e middle ground between artifi cial and natural selection: Niche construction as developmental bias". Aft er John OdlingSmee, Laland is one of major proponents of the niche construction model. He sees niche construction as opposite and complementary to natural selection. He also contrasted the niche construction view with Richard Dawkins' extended phenotype perspective. However, the niche construction model uses natural selection as a necessary component of the evolution mechanism (see Odling-Smee et al. 2003) . To put it simply, organisms can strongly aff ect the selection pressure by the way in which their behaviours change their own environment. According to this model, the behavioural bias or the developmental bias and natural selection work together. Ecological inheritance plays an important role in this. An organisms' decision-making is a factor that infl uences natural selection. 9
Day 2 began (aft er a brief welcome note from Denis Noble) with a lecture by James Shapiro ("Biological action in Read-Write genome evolution"), in which he gave many examples of endosymbiosis, hybridization, horizontal DNA transfers, regulatory functions by non-coded RNAs etc., as examples of how living organisms regularly use generic activities to facilitate their own evolution. In particular, he noted that hybridization is a trigger for reorganization of the genome (see also Shapiro 2011) .
Paul Griffi ths ("Genetic, epigenetic and exogenetic information in development and evolution") described a new measure of biological information, formalizing the concept of information as specifi c diff erence making. He saw it as a generalization of Francis Crick's conception of information, aiming to build a measure applicable both at the genetic and the epigenetic levels.
Eva Jablonka ("Th e role of epigenetic inheritance in evolution") recalled Karl Popper's strongly critical evaluation of Darwinism (see Niemann 2014) . While Ernst Mayr (1980: 17) has claimed that "soft inheritance does not exist", 10 Popper, to the contrary, viewed organisms as active agents, making it possible for an evolutionary change to start from the phenotype, not from the genotype. Once again repeating Mary Jane One can see a similarity between constracting a niche and constructing a scaff olding (as described, e.g., by Hoff meyer 2014). However, according to Laland, scaff olding is a special case of niche construction. 10 Th e whole sentence runs: "It was perhaps the greatest contribution of the young science of genetics to show that soft inheritance does not exist" (Mayr 1980: 17;  Mayr dedicated this article to Bernhard Rensch). maxim that genes are followers, not leaders, 11 Jablonka also spoke about the role of what has been called adaptive improvization (Soen et al. 2015) . She made the summary: "(1) Phenotype fi rst -the activity (phenotypic accommodation) of the organism is fundamental, and drives evolutionary processes. (2) Hereditary variation -there is more to heredity than genes. Evolution can occur on diff erent (interacting) axes. (3) Selection -there is more to selection than natural selection. (4) Natural selection is not the only process that can lead to cumulative evolutionary change". Proceeding from this, she asked: "Together, does this mean that all we need is just a cosmetic change to the Modern Synthesis? What would count as a revision?" 12 Greg Hurst ("Extended genomes: Symbiosis and evolution") introduced some interesting deviations from the standard model that stemmed from the role of symbiosis. He spoke about the holobiont as a level (and a unit) of selection and demonstrated how microbial variation can produce inter-individual phenotypic variation that aff ects survival and reproduction. "Symbiosis aff ords opportunity to develop otherwise unavailable phenotypes, " he said.
In his lecture "Evolution viewed from medicine and physiology" Denis Noble described how organisms can and do harness stochasticity in order to generate functionalityproviding explanations for these mechanisms. Due to this, the evolutionary process is directional, and this is a huge change, not a mere tinkering or minor change in Modern Synthesis. Th is, as he said, turns neo-Darwinism on its head. Th is is a major change that has implications in economics, political theory, and various other disciplines, philosophy included. As a consequence, the evolutionary equations that have been used for modelling evolution have to be revised. Noble also emphasized that conceptual change in biology is not based on one experiment, but on cumulative evidence.
Andy Gardner in his talk (""Anthropomorphism" in evolutionary biology") analysed a formulation common in neo-Darwinian biology that "organisms strive to maximize their fi tness". He showed the similarity between the adaptation concepts of William Paley and of Darwinians. According to Gardner, Darwin's theory, viewed on such an approximation, has an enormous predictive power for biology.
In his talk "Adaptability and evolution", Patrick Bateson, aft er recalling the work of James Mark Baldwin (the Baldwin eff ect as an adaptability driver), Jean Piaget (his Behaviour and Evolution from 1979, also mentioned by Eva Jablonka), and Michael Conrad (adaptability is related to the uncertainty of the environment), spoke about the importance of play and playfulness in creativity and innovation. Play, as he said, enhances adaptability. Generalist species are more playful than specialist species.
A round table discussion with Andy Gardner, Marcus Feldman, Tobias Uller and Douglas Futuyma closed the second day. In her introduction to the discussion, Nancy Cartwright compared sciences as either testable operational (as Karl Popper put it), or research programmes (as characterized by Imre Lakatos). She admitted that Darwinian evolution was a viable research programme. Another distinction, when speaking about selection, concerns the problem whether there is viability selection or fertility selection. (Or -is there selection?) As to the main discussion point, Eva Jablonka asked Douglas Futuyma what he would consider a major extension and not just cosmetics of evolutionary theory. Futuyma responded that there was a comfortable assimilation of new ideas into the Modern Synthesis, but what would be really new would be a mechanism for adaptation that is not based on selection; that would be really surprising. 13
Day 3 of the meeting saw more speakers from the fi eld of anthropology, with the particular theme of applying the concept of niche construction in the sphere of culture.
Samir Okasha ("Evolution and the metaphor of agency") demonstrated how the metaphoric agential thinking that has become widespread in neo-Darwinian discourse is misleading and should be avoided, particularly as it inhibits the correct usage of the concept of agency in biology. Organisms, at least as far as they can make true choices, are agents. Th e speaker assumed that organisms have a single overall goal. However, in order to make a true choice, there is no need for a single overall goal; it is enough to have local simultaneous options.
Karola Stotz spoke in her presentation ("Developmental niche construction") how the environment is also a creator of variation, and how species-typical knowledge is acquired via social networks, referring among others to Jean Piaget, Paul Weiss, and Scott Gilbert. Broadening historically the niche construction concept, she quoted West and King (1987: 552) who suggest asking "not what's inside the genes you inherited, but what the genes you inherited are inside of " (see also Oyama 2000) . 14 Tim Lewens ("Human nature, human culture: Th e case of cultural evolution") pointed out that the study of cultural evolution does not need the culture/nature distinction. Moreover, with reference to Christina Toren, the cultural/biological distinction is problematic. Th us, it can be claimed that social process is fundamental, whereas the type of culture is its product.
Agustí n Fuentes ("Human niche, human behaviour, human nature") provided some archeological data that demonstrated a growth of violence in the course of cultural evolution, also pointing out during the discussion that semiotics is of vital importance in understanding the human niche.
Andrew Whiten ("A second inheritance system: Th e extension of biology through culture") spoke about the role of social learning and social inheritance, and gave many examples of it.
Susan Antó n ("Human evolution, niche construction and plasticity") asked how much the phenotype having been considered unimportant has infl uenced the study of human evolution.
Melinda Zeder ("Domestication: A model system for evolutionary biology") spoke about evolvability in a human-engineered niche, and ecological inheritance. She pointed out how in case of domestication the changes in diff erent genes can be connected.
In the fi nal round table discussion with Robert Foley, Christina Toren, Melinda Zeder, Tim Lewens and Eva Jablonka, some take-home messages were expressed. Foley explained why the modifi ed theory of evolution is more suitable for social sciences and humanities than the earlier one. Toren noted that, in addition to process ontology, also process epistemology is needed. Jablonka stressed that the fi rst question to be asked is how a social system is maintained across time; once this is understood, we could start to study how it is changing or how to change it. Jablonka also said: "Natural selection is only a special case of diff erential stabilization", and, concerning methodology, she claimed that thick descriptions are important also in biology and ecology. Th e discussants found it was important to think how to make biologists interested in the work of the social sciences.
Concluding remarks
Agency, learning, niche construction, meaning-making -these are phenomena common to living beings. Anthropology and cultural evolution studies that deal with these phenomena can benefi t from biology that includes them. A turn towards this kind of biology was the aim of the meeting.
Th e views of a scientist can change, and oft en do change, before there is enough evidence for a new view. For example, my view on mechanisms of evolution moved away from Modern Synthesis already in the late 1970s, as a result of taking seriously the work of Karl Ernst von Baer, Lev Berg and Sergei Meyen, and being infl uenced by the group of Conrad Waddington. However, the diffi cult, hard problem for biology is to explain the origin, role, and reality of meaning. 15 Only a theory that can deal with this can without losses suit anthropology and cultural sciences. Th e mechanism of evolution that is relevant to this has to be capable of explaining adaptation and functionality independently from natural selection. Here, the work of last decades is decisive.
As it has been explained by several scholars, the non-selectionist adaptationmaking mechanism is based on the capacity of organisms to fi nd solutions in new situations and keep these if they met their needs. Organisms themselves do not test their behaviour against survivorship -they do it against the fulfi llment of their current needs, and this is usually enough to keep their line alive, maybe for millions of years. Random genetic processes build or transform stochastic constraints that are channeling behavioural possibilities and make the forms inheritable. Assortative mating, that is unavoidable in the case of biparentality, results in a certain inbreeding and reduction of intraspecies genetic variability. Strictly speaking, adaptation (and speciation) is possible without natural selection.
As has oft en been the case in recent decades, if only some aspects of the new view get described, its interpretation in the framework of Modern Synthesis will be presented soon. However, what really changes the theory of evolution is a model that demonstrates adaptation without natural selection. And, as was said above, this result already exists.
Th us, functionalism and structuralism become integrated in the current turn, resulting in a semiotic biology that could best suit not only social sciences and humanities, but also biology itself. Th e neo-Darwinian theory will stay as a restricted special case of a much richer and deeper theory of evolution (see also Ingold, Palsson 2013).
Denis Noble and his colleagues organized a meeting at the Royal Society that may prove to have been historic. Not because of any new results per se (the results as well as their new interpretations were published earlier) but for the collective shift in viewpoint. It was not a scientifi c turn -that had already happened some years earlier.
However, it was a social turn in evolutionary biology (irrespective of the fact that in the Society for the Study of Evolution, and in the European Society for Evolutionary Biology the turn still seems to be ahead) -the meeting in which, I suppose, the majority of the attendants felt it. 16 For me, the scientifi c turn in evolutionary theory had happened already at the meeting of the Linnean Society in 2011, while the important scientifi c results themselves were on the table even earlier.
Above all, for diff erent interpreters the science moves diff erently. Th ere are many evolutions in one evolution. Th e history of life -the history of semiotic systems -is plural, and everything that is meaningful is essentially plural. 17
